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H5N6 is a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and a zoonotic disease that causes
recurring endemics in East Asia. At least 155 H5N6 outbreaks, including 15 human
infections, have been reported in China. These repeated outbreaks have increased
concern that the H5N6 virus may cross over to humans and cause a pandemic. In
February, 2016, peafowls in a breeding farm exhibited a highly contagious disease.
Post-mortem examinations, including RT-PCR, and virus isolation, confirmed that the
highly pathogenic H5N6 influenza virus was the causative agent, and the strain was
named A/Pavo Cristatus/Jiangxi/JA1/2016. In animal experiments, it exhibited high
pathogenicity in chickens and an estimated median lethal dose in mice of∼104.3 TCID50.
A phylogenetic analysis showed that JA1/2016 was clustered in H5 clade 2.3.4.4.
FG594-like H5N6 virus from Guangdong Province was the probable predecessor of
JA1/2016, and the estimated divergence time was June 2014. Furthermore, we found
that H5N6 influenza viruses can be classified into the two following groups: Group 1
and Group 2. Group 2 influenza viruses have not been detected since the end of 2014,
whereas Group 1 influenza viruses have continually evolved and reassorted with the
“gene pool” circulating in south China, resulting in the rise of novel subtypes of this
influenza virus. An increase in the number of its identified hosts, the expanding range
of its distribution, and the continual evolution of H5N6 AIVs enhance the risk that an
H5N6 virus may spread to other continents and cause a pandemic.
Keywords: highly pathogenic avian influenza, H5N6, Pavo cristatus, phylogenetic analysis, molecular
characterization, genetic reassortment
INTRODUCTION
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is one of the most concerning infectious diseases in
the world (Taubenberger and Morens, 2008). Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV)
infections usually cause a highly contagious systemic disease with significant morbidity and
mortality in susceptible populations, resulting in severe economic losses (Bevins et al., 2016a). Low
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses usually trigger milder and primarily respiratory disease
in birds. Inmost cases, LPAI viral infections have little impact on the poultry industry, but the threat
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they pose to public health cannot be ignored. First, LPAI
viruses occasionally induce relatively high mortality in chicks
(Alexander, 2000). Second, some LPAI viruses have resulted
in lethal infections in humans. These include the H7N9 virus,
which causes endemic in China (Belser et al., 2016b; Zhu et al.,
2016). LPAI and HPAI viruses co-circulate around the world,
comprising a viral “gene pool.” As a result of the accumulation of
site mutations, genetic reassortment, and genetic recombination,
novel AIVs arise quickly and frequently, causing repeated
outbreaks in birds and sporadic cases in humans (Durrant
et al., 2016). Although not yet a pandemic, these recurring AIV
outbreaks pose a persistent potential pandemic threat throughout
the world.
Since 2009, the worldwide dissemination of H5 clade 2.3.4.4
HPAI viruses has become a serious threat to the poultry industry
in China (Smith et al., 2015). Outbreaks of viruses in this clade
have included the H5N1, H5N2, H5N6, and H5N8 subtypes
(Claes et al., 2016). In 2014, the first outbreak of the HPAI
H5N6 virus was confirmed in a poultry farm in Nanchong City,
Sichuan Province, China (FAO). Approximately 155 outbreaks
have been reported in 18 provinces (and/or autonomous regions)
across China, including 15 cases of human infections (FAO,
Supplementary Figure 1). Additionally, at least 20 outbreaks have
also been reported in Laos and Vietnam (FAO). Importantly,
H5N6 is the only subtype among the clade 2.3.4.4 viruses that
has caused human infections (Shen et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2015;
Pan et al., 2016). The recurrence of these outbreaks has increased
concern that H5N6 viruses may cross over to mammals.
Moreover, the geographic distributions of H5N6 viruses and
their hosts have considerably expanded (Supplementary Figure
1). There is no evidence that H5N6 influenza viruses have been
transmitted in another continent, but HPAI H5N6 viruses have
been detected in migratory birds, and this increases the risk that
these viruses could spread to other countries or continents (Bi
et al., 2016).
Here, we investigated the virologic and phylogenetic
characteristics of the HPAI H5N6 virus in the Pavo Cristatus
breeding farm in Jiangxi Province, China. Furthermore, we
analyzed the co-circulation of H5N6 AIVs within the “viral gene
pool” that is circulating in Asia, Europe, and North America.




These animal studies were performed in strict accordance with
the Guidelines for the Care and Use of Animals in Research,
which are issued by the Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of
Sciences. This study was evaluated and approved by the Animal
Ethics Committee of the Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy
of Sciences. All experiments were conducted in a Biosafety Level
3 (BSL-3) facility.
Sample Collection
Swab samples, tissue samples, and environmental samples
were collected from the breeding farm. More specifically,
oropharyngeal, and cloacal swabs were collected from affected
peafowls. Swab samples were placed in 10% w/v PBS buffer
containing antibiotics (penicillin and streptomycin, 2,000 IU)
and then ground and centrifuged to collect supernatants for RNA
extraction and virus isolation. Tissue samples (i.e., the brain,
lungs, heart, liver, spleen, intestines, and kidneys) were collected
under aseptic conditions and then stored and transported on ice.
Environmental samples, including water, food, or fecal samples,
were collected and stored as swab samples.
Virus Isolation and Sequencing
The inoculum for each sample was propagated in 11-day-old
SPF chicken eggs (Vital River). Allantoic fluids were harvested
from eggs that had died within 72 h after inoculation. The
influenza virus was isolated, sequenced, and named A/Pavo
Cristatus/Jiangxi/JA1/2016 (H5N6). The following primers were














a and b: primers used to amplify HA, NA, NP, M, and NS gene
segments;
a andd: primers used to separately amplify the upper section of
the PB2, PB1, and PA genes;
b andc: primers used to separately acquire the second half of
the PB2, PB1, and PA genes.
All PCR products were cloned into the pEASY-Blunt vector
(Transgen) and sequenced (BGI). The results were assembled and
submitted to the NCBI database.
Phylogenetic Analysis
The phylogenetic analyses were performed using the listed
gene sequences, which were acquired during a NCBI BLAST
analysis. H5- and N6-subtype influenza virus sequences that were
deposited from 2012 to 2016 were downloaded from the NCBI
and/or the GISAID database. The reference sequences used for
the H5-subtype influenza virus classifications were chosen based
on guidance from OIE. All of the segmented sequence datasets
were aligned using ClustalW 1.6. The alignment lengths for each
gene segment dataset were as follows: PB2, 2,280 nt; PB1, 2,271
nt; PA, 2,151 nt; HA, 1692 nt; NP, 1482 nt; NA, 1,413 nt; M, 981
nt; and NS, 822 nt.
Preliminary analyses were performed to estimate the best-
fit nucleotide substitution model using jModeltest2 (Darriba
et al., 2012). To estimate divergence times and rates of
nucleotide substitutions, we used an uncorrelated relax-clock
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Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo method in BEAST v1.8.4
(Drummond et al., 2012). To determine which were the best-
fit phylodynamic models, we performed different combinations
of relaxed-clock models (i.e., exponential and log-normal
models) and branch rate models (i.e., constant, exponential,
expansion, and Bayersian SkyGrid models). The resultant *log
files were imported into Tracer (v1.6) and then analyzed using
model comparison analyses (AICM analysis; Drummond and
Bouckaert, 2015). The best fit substitution models, relaxed-clock
models, and tree models are listed in Supplementary Tables
S1, S2. For each analysis, MCMC chains were run for 50
million iterations and sampled every 5 1000 iterations after a
10% burn-in to ensure an effective sample size was obtained
for all posterior parameters, including the posterior, prior,
likelihood, and meanRate (ESS > 200). For Clade 2.3.4.4 subtype
H5 AIVs and N6 subtype AIVs analyses, the MCMC chains
were run for 400 million iterations. Maximum clade credibility
(MCC) trees were obtained from the MCMC tree samples using
TreeAnnotator v1.8.4 (Drummond et al., 2012). The resulting
trees were edited and illustrated using FigTree (v1.4.2; Morariu
et al., 2009).
Animals Experiment
To test the pathogenicity of the JA1/2016 virus, groups of five
6- to 8-week-old BALB/c mice (Vital River Laboratory, Beijing,
China) were anesthetized using CO2 and then intranasally (i.n.)
inoculated with 0.1ml of serial 10-fold dilutions of infectious
virus in PBS. The estimated median lethal dose was calculated
and expressed as a TCID50 (50% tissue culture infectious dose)
value. We inoculated 6-week-old chickens (n = 10) (Merial Vital
laboratory, Beijing, China) intravenously with 0.1ml of diluted
allantoic fluid (hemagglutinin unit: 32). All of the chickens were
killed by the infection within 24 h after inoculation. All of these
experiments were conducted in a biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) facility.
RESULTS
Pavo cristatus were Killed by Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus
On February 20th, 2016, a few captive peafowls (Pavo Cristatus)
were found dead in a breeding farm in Jiangxi Province, China.
During the next week, more than 98% (770/787) of the farm
peafowls were affected. All of the infected birds died within
24 h of the onset of clinical manifestations. Typical clinical
signs, including neural system disorder and diarrhea, were
observed, and these were consistent with the pathology observed
in bar-headed geese that were infected with the HPAI H5N1
virus (Liu et al., 2005). Gross lesions, including those caused
by gastrointestinal tract hemorrhaging, severe pneumonia, and
encephalitis, were noted (Figure 1). All lesions were confirmed
using histopathological analyses. Post-mortem examinations,
RT-PCR detection, and virus isolation confirmed that the
H5N6 influenza virus was the causative agent, and the strain
was designated A/Pavo Cristatus/Jiangxi/JA1/2016 (abbreviated
JA1/2016). No other subtype of influenza virus was detected.
FIGURE 1 | Gross lesions in dead peafowls. (A) Hyperemia and
hemorrhaging were observed in the brain. In addition, severe hemorrhaging
(black arrows) was observed in the glandular stomach (B), intestine (C), and
lung (D).
Genesis Analysis of the Novel H5N6
Influenza Virus
To understand the origin of JA1/2016, we performed blast
analyses using the NCBI database. Our results demonstrated
that JA1/2016 was most closely related to H5N6 AIVs
that were previously isolated from Guangdong Province,
China (Table 1). More phylogenetic information was
estimated using MCC trees generated by BEAST (v1.8.4)
software.
The resulting MCC trees suggested that the JA1/2016
hemagglutinin (HA) gene was clustered into the H5 clade 2.3.4.4
(Figure 2A), whereas its neuraminidase (NA) gene was derived
from the Eurasian lineage (Figure 2B). The evolutionary rates
(i.e., substitutions/site/year) of the eight gene segments of these
H5N6 AIVs were estimated by Bayesian analysis (Table 2).
Among the eight gene segments of H5N6 viruses, HA and NA
genes had evolved slightly faster than the other analyzed gene
segments, whereas theM gene evolved the slowest relative to the
other analyzed segments. Ne estimation (i.e., number of genes
effectively giving rise to the next generation) of HA and NA genes
indicated an increase of the effective population size since 2013
(Supplementary Figure 3).
Based on the MCC trees, we noted that the H5N6 subtype
AIVs represented a triple-reassorted influenza virus that
consisted of theH5N1,H5N2, andH6N6 influenza viruses, which
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FIGURE 2 | Genetic analysis of JA1/2016. The phylogenetic trees were constructed using gene sequences identified in NCBI or GISAID Blast analyses. Panels
(A,B) represent the HA and NA genes, respectively. JA1/2016 is marked in red. The trees were built using BEAST (v1.8.4) and illustrated using FigTree (v1.4.2).
is consistent with previous studies (Wong, 2015). The MCC trees
derived using eight gene segments revealed that JA1/2016 shared
the highest homology with A/Chicken/Guangdong/FG594/2015




2A–F; Yuan et al., 2016). These results prompted us to consider
that the FG594-like H5N6 virus from Guangdong Province
was the probable predecessor of JA1/2016, and the estimated
divergence time was June 2014 (Figure 3).
Molecular Characteristics of JA1/2016
To further understand the potential of JA1/2016 to cause a
pandemic in mammals, we analyzed its molecular characteristics.
The results suggested that JA1/2016 possessed multiple basic
amino acids (-PLRERRRKR-) at an HA cleavage site, indicating
that it is highly pathogenic to chickens (Supplementary Table S1;
Webster and Rott, 1987). The Q222L and G224S substitutions
in HA (H5 numbering system) suggested tropism in the
avian-type receptor (SA-alpha-2,3 Gal; Supplementary Table S1;
Matrosovich et al., 2000). In the NA protein, an 11-amino-acid
deletion was found in the stalk region (residues 59–69). This
deletion could influence the replication, virulence, and host range
of the virus (Matrosovich et al., 1999). Residues in PA (L672),
PB1 (H99, I368), and PB2 (T271, Q591, E627, D701) indicated
that the virus was capable of air-borne transmission but showed
low adaption to mammals (Steel et al., 2009; Bussey et al., 2010;
Yamada et al., 2010; Herfst et al., 2012; Zhong et al., 2014).
No drug resistance-associated mutations were found in the M2
protein (Supplementary Table S1). However, some key molecular
features that have been associated with increased virulence in
mammals were found in JA1/2016 (Supplementary Table S1). For
example, a truncated PB1-F2 was found in JA1/2016, and this
could increase its likelihood of adapting to mammals (Neumann
et al., 2009). The NS1 protein has a 5-aa deletion at position 80–
84 that also increases the virulence of the virus in mice (Zhu
et al., 2008). Hence, from a molecular analysis point of view,
several key steps are required for JA1/2016 to efficiently infect
mammals.
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TABLE 1 | Gene segments of JA1/2016 demonstrating that it is most
closely related to the H5N6 viruses that were isolated from Guangdong
Province, China.
Gene Virus strains Identity (%)




NA A/Chicken/Guangdong/FG594/2015 (H5N6) 99.3
A/great_egret/Hong_Kong/00032/2016 (H5N6)
PB2 A/duck/Vietnam/LBM760/2014 (H5N6) 99.3
A/muscovy duck/Vietnam/LBM757/2014 (H5N6) 99.3
PB1 A/environment/Guangdong/GZ670/2015 (H5N6) 99.1
A/Chicken/Guangdong/FG594/2015 (H5N6) 98.9
PA A/Chicken/Guangdong/FG594/2015 (H5N6) 99.2
A/environment/Guangdong/ZS558/2015 (H5N6) 99.1
NP A/Chicken/Guangdong/FG594/2015 (H5N6) 99.3
A/environment/Guangdong/GZ693/2015 (H5N6) 99.3
M A/feline/Guangdong/1/2015 (H5N6) 99.6
A/feline/Guangdong/2/2015 (H5N6) 99.6
NS A/feline/Guangdong/1/2015 (H5N6) 99.2
A/feline/Guangdong/2/2015(H5N6) 99.2
TABLE 2 | Estimated evolutionary rates of each gene segments of H5N6
viruses.
Genes Substitution rate and 95% HPD (10−3 substitution/site/year)
Mean Lower Upper
PB2 3.35 2.84 4.23
PB1 3.87 3.01 4.75
PA 2.92 2.20 3.68
HA 4.38 2.94 5.78
NP 2.91 2.01 3.90
NA 4.22 3.14 5.32
M 2.02 1.15 2.59
NS 2.95 2.23 3.65
Pathogenicity of JA1/2016 in Chickens and
Mice
To assess its virulence, mice and chickens were artificially
infected with JA1/2016. The intravenous pathogenicity index
(IVPI) of JA1/2016 was 3.0. All of the experimentally infected
chickens died within 24 h of infection. Typical clinical signs were
observed, including facial swelling, diarrhea, fluffed feathers, and
huddling behaviors. BALB/c mice were also used to estimate the
virus’ pathogenicity in mammals, including humans. The results
showed that the estimatedmedian lethal dose for the HPAIH5N6
virus was ∼104.3 TCID50. Infection was restricted to the lungs,
and no viral RNA or particles were detected in the brain or
intestines.
Genetic Characteristics of H5 Clade 2.3.4.4
Subtype AIV Isolates Collected from 2012
to 2016
Genetic reassortment and recombination are the major sources
of novel emerging AIVs. A “viral gene pool,” which is established
by co-circulation among a diversity of AIVs, is persistent in
Asia (Chen et al., 2016). This “gene pool” shares surface and/or
internal viral genes withH5N6 isolates that produce novel variant
AIVs. To explore the interface between H5N6 HPAIVs and the
“viral gene pool,” we performed a phylogenetic analysis using H5-
and N6-subtype isolates that were collected in Asia, Europe and
North America from 2012 to 2016. TheMCC trees revealed some
of the characteristics of Clade 2.3.4.4 AIV evolution.
First, we found that H5 Clade 2.3.4.4 AIVs comprised the
following several subtype AIVs: H5N1, H5N2, H5N6, H5N8, and
H5N3. H5N6 and H5N8 AIVs are the most commonmembers of
the clade 2.3.4.4 viruses (Figure 4). Based on a phylogenetic tree,
we found that H5N6 subtype AIVs had already donated their HA
gene to the H5N1, H5N2, and H5N8 subtype AIVs, causing these
AIVs to pose a novel threat to poultry and wild birds (Figure 4).
Second, we found that H5N6 AIVs could be divided into
Group 1 and Group 2 viruses (Figure 4). Group 2 H5N6 HPAIVs
showed limited evolutionary activity because group 2 H5N6 virus
endemics were “terminated” by the year 2014. In contrast, Group
1 H5N6 viruses continuously evolved, as shown by the following:
(1) all of the most recently isolated H5N6 HPAIVs are clustered
into this sub-lineage; (2) more frequent genetic reassortment
(H5N1, H5N2, andH5N8) is observed in this group; (3) theHPAI
H5N6 virus has a wider range of hosts, especially migratory birds
and raptors, and this increases concern that H5N6 may spread to
other regions of the world.
Genetic Characteristics of N6-Subtype AIV
Isolates Collected from 2012 to 2016
We next focused on the genetic analysis of N6 genes. We
found that N6 subtype AIVs can be grouped into the following
two lineages: Eurasian and North American (Figure 5). Most
of the identified H5N6 isolates belonged to the Eurasian
lineage. The H10N6 and H7N6 influenza viruses were closely
related to the H5N6 viruses that are circulating in South
China (Figure 5). These results indicate that H5N6 AIVs have
undergone reassortment with the H10N8 and H7N9 viruses,
consistent with previous studies (Lam et al., 2015;Ma et al., 2015).
Additionally, there is no evidence showing that the N6 genes of
H5N6 AIVs were transmitted to other continents. However, the
Common Teal (Anas crecca), which has a wintering region that
includes areas such as the Beringian Crucible (Alaska and the
Russian Far East), has been identified as a host for the H5N6
influenza virus. The Beringian Crucible is an important channel
of communication between the Eurasian and North American
lineages (Lee et al., 2015). Evidence of reassortment among
H5N8, H5N2, and H5N1 is rightfully increasing concern that
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FIGURE 3 | The possible evolutionary history of the JA1/2016 virus. The viral gene pool circulating in south and east China has played a pivotal role in the
genesis of JA1/2016. However, the virus must be further adapted to efficiently infect humans.
FIGURE 4 | Phylogenetic analysis of H5 subtype influenza viruses identified in 2012–2016 in Asia, Europe, and North America. The MCC trees were built
using BEAST (v1.8.4) and illustrated using FigTree (v1.4.2).
H5N6 might become capable of spreading to other regions of the
world.
DISCUSSION
HPAIV is a health challenge to poultry species, mammals, wild
birds, and humans. These viruses cause considerable economic
losses around the world. In our research, we reported an outbreak
of HPAIH5N6 virus in a peafowl farm in Jiangxi Province, China.
The isolated JA1/2016 virus was most probably transmitted to
Jiangxi Province from Guangdong Province, and the estimated
divergence time between JA1/2016 and the FG594-like virus was
June 2014, indicating that JA1/2016 had undergone a long period
of antigenic drift (Figure 3). Additionally, we found that HA and
NA gene evolved faster than other gene segments, the results
indicated that antigenic drift plays an important role in the
adaption of H5N6 influenza viruses. The SkyGrid figure for the
HA and NA genes suggested an increase in number of effective
population size since the year 2013, which is in agreement
with the emergence and dissemination of these triple-reassortant
H5N6 AIVs (Supplementary Figure 3; Bi et al., 2015).
The continual evolution of H5N6 AIVs highlights the
persistent threat that is posed by the influenza ecosystem of
China. First, H5N6 HPAIVs have repeatedly caused outbreaks in
the breeding industry (Supplementary Figure 1). Second, H5N6
HPAIVs have already spilled over into wild bird populations,
whichmay result in the spread of these viruses to other continents
during long-distance migrations (Figure 4). Third, the risk that
H5N6 might cause a pandemic in humans is limited. Finally,
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FIGURE 5 | Phylogenetic analysis of N6 subtype AIVs in Asia, Europe, and North America. The MCC trees were built using BEAST (v1.8.4) and illustrated
using FigTree (v1.4.2).
the enzootic H5N1, H5N2, H5N8 viruses and H5N6 AIVs
have been found to interact with the “viral gene pool” that is
circulating in Asia, and this has given rise to novel variants,
such as H10N6, H7N6, H3N6, and novel H5N8 (Figures 3, 4).
Relatively little is known about H7N6 and H10N6 AIVs or their
pathogenicity in mammals. It is difficult to assess their threat to
humans.Moreover, manymixed isolates have been noted because
of their homology to H10N6 viruses (Figure 4). These results
suggest that chickens are extensively co-infected with AIVs that
and long-term monitoring of AIVs in poultry is consequently
necessary.
In fact, the low pathogenicity H5N6 influenza viruses
has been noted in the past. For example, H5N6 was
detected in Wisconsin in 1975, in Germany in 1984, and
in California in 2013, but these outbreaks had little impact
on the poultry industry or public health. In 2013, another
H5N6 AIV (A/duck/Vietnam/LBM360c1-4-1/2013) was
submitted to the NCBI database (GenBank: LC010696). Based
on our analysis, this virus obtained its surface gene from
A/duck/Khanhhoa/CWI-36/2014 (H5N1) and A/muscovy
duck/Quang Ninh/71/2013(H6N6). The latter is closely
related to the donor H6N6 virus, which is a Group 2
H5N6 influenza virus (Figure 4). Intriguingly, LBM360c1-
4-1 and Group 2 AIVs then vanished for reasons that remain
unclear.
We selected 122 strains of H5N6 viruses for our analysis.
Among these, 66.39% of the viruses were derived from
poultry (22 chickens, 47 ducks, and 12 geese), while 12
isolates were derived from eight species of migratory birds,
and these were found to harbor H5N6 AIVs. These results
indicated that the H5N6 virus has become entrenched in
an ecological niche from which it may present a long-term
pandemic threat to other regions of the world. Currently,
H5N6 AIVs require additional adaptations to infect humans
(Supplementary Table S3). However, their continual evolution
and the extensive exposure of the human population to
the H5N6 virus or its variants increases the risk that
these viruses will acquire the ability to be transmitted from
human-to-human.
Recent studies have revealed that the Beringian Crucible
plays a role in influenza virus transmission (Ip et al., 2008;
Pearce et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2015). Beringian Crucible is an
important breeding ground for both New World and Old World
migratory systems. It is estimated that approximately 1.5–2.9
million aquatic birds migrate from Asia to Alaska annually.
These birds provide a potential channel by which AIVs could
be transmitted intercontinentally. Evidence has demonstrated
the successful transmission of the H5N8 virus from Eurasia
to America (Lee et al., 2015). The Common Teal is a type of
migratory bird that has been identified as a host of the H5N6
virus. The breeding region of the teal is widely distributed
and spans the area from Siberia to the Far East and the
Beringian Crucible. The risk that H5N6 could be transmitted
to other continents is consequently increased. Overall, we
suggest that scientists in other countries should pay more
attention to the control and surveillance of the H5N6 influenza
viruses.
A major limitation of this study is that our major conclusion
regarding the origin of JA1/2016 and the genesis of Group 1
H5N6 AIVs is based solely on a phylogenetic analysis. Although
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phylogenetic analyses are widely used to trace the source of AIVs,
overstatements regarding conclusions have been drawn by many
researchers. Despite the controversy regarding these algorithms,
the data that were used in most of our analyses were obtained
over time from some, but not all, of the infected hosts (see figure
2.9 in the followed reference; Drummond and Bouckaert, 2015).
For this reason, improved methods for determining sampling
density (both space and time) are needed to more accurately
evaluate AIV evolution.
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